‘Experience had taught it the penalties of neglecting logistical preparations, the germans, by contrast, accorded far less effort to logistical preparatinos because they were habituated to fighting continental wars across short distances supported by good communications. British generals, and in particular Montgomery, have been frequently castigated because of their habit of waiting until their logistical arrangement were in perfect order before taking the offensive. German generals, and in particular Rommel, have conversely been accorded high praise for their willingness to take risks with their logistics. these criticism fly in the face of all logic. The German system worked well across the short distances involved in fighting in France and Poland, and against enemies with an inferior operation doctrine….but in Russia, North Africa and finally in Normandy the German effort foundered, this was because their reach exceeded their logistical grasp. time and again in North Africa Rommel was able to achieve tactical successes, but lack of transport meant he could not transform them into operational victories. British offensives may have proceeded at a more stately pace, and on occasion the logistical system could not meet all demands placed upon it. But after 1941, major british operations rarely failed because of a breakdown of logistics’

French, D., Raising Churchill’s army (Oxford, Oxford University press, 2000), p120-121